Insider threats are among the most damaging risks organizations face, yet they remain largely invisible in public reporting. While external breaches dominate headlines, insider misuse is often hidden behind HR files, legal settlements, or vague references to “credential misuse.” This silence is not accidental. It is a structural reporting gap that distorts our understanding of risk and leaves executives dangerously underprepared.
The Scale of Insider Threats
Insider incidents are not rare. IBM Security found that 83 percent of organizations reported at least one insider attack in 2024. Cybersecurity Insiders reported that 48 percent of organizations saw insider attacks increase in frequency, with nearly half experiencing six or more incidents in a single year. The National Insider Threat Special Interest Group documented over 6,200 insider incidents globally across organizations of all sizes. These numbers show that insider activity is widespread and persistent.
Yet when we scan breach disclosures, insider cases barely appear. External attacks are reported within days, while insider breaches often surface months later, if at all. This discrepancy is the reporting gap.
Why Insider Threats Go Unreported
Several structural and cultural factors explain why insider breaches rarely make it into public view:
- Detection lag: Insiders operate under legitimate credentials. Their actions blend into normal workflows until damage is discovered long after the fact.
- Disclosure reluctance: Companies fear reputational harm. Admitting that trusted employees or contractors abused access is more embarrassing than admitting to an external hack.
- Legal framing: Insider incidents are often categorized as fraud, misconduct, or HR issues rather than cybersecurity breaches. This keeps them out of breach databases and public reports.
- Attribution difficulty: Credential misuse blurs the line between insider and outsider. Many breaches labeled as external may actually involve insider negligence or collusion.
The Cost of Silence
The financial impact of insider incidents is staggering. Cybersecurity Insiders reported that 29 percent of organizations faced remediation costs exceeding 1 million dollars per insider attack. Beyond financial loss, insider breaches erode trust, compromise intellectual property, and damage morale.
The silence around insider incidents compounds the damage. When organizations fail to disclose these events, they mislead stakeholders, regulators, and peers. They also miss opportunities to learn from shared experiences. The reporting gap is not just a transparency issue. It is a risk multiplier.
Sector Bias in Reporting
Industries with mandatory disclosure requirements show more insider cases. Healthcare under HIPAA and finance under GLBA are required to report breaches, so insider misuse surfaces more often. In contrast, technology and manufacturing sectors often remain silent. This creates a skewed perception that insider threats are less common outside regulated industries, when in fact they are just less visible.
For example, healthcare breach reports frequently cite insider snooping on patient records. Financial institutions disclose insider trading or data misuse under regulatory pressure. But in technology companies, insider misuse of intellectual property is often handled quietly, with little public disclosure.
Historical Context
The reporting gap is not new. The Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) has consistently shown insider misuse as a significant vector, yet case studies remain sparse compared to external attacks. The Ponemon Institute has found that insider incidents account for nearly 25 to 30 percent of breaches, but only a fraction are publicly disclosed.
This historical silence has created a distorted narrative: external attackers are seen as the primary threat, while insiders are treated as secondary. In reality, insiders often cause more damage because they bypass perimeter defenses and exploit trust.
Closing the Gap
Executives and boards should assume insider incidents are happening even if none are reported. The reporting gap itself is a risk multiplier. By acknowledging the silence, organizations can:
- Invest in monitoring tools that detect subtle misuse of credentials.
- Establish clear disclosure policies that treat insider incidents as security breaches, not just HR issues.
- Educate leadership on the hidden prevalence of insider threats, reframing silence as evidence of risk.
- Collaborate across industries to share anonymized case studies, reducing stigma and improving collective defense.
Conclusion
The real story is not just about insider threats themselves but about the silence surrounding them. Every unreported incident is a blind spot that weakens collective resilience. For security leaders, the challenge is not only to detect and prevent insider misuse but also to break through the reporting gap that keeps these threats in the shadows.
Executives should treat the absence of reports as a warning sign, not a reassurance. Silence is the risk.
Sources:
- National Insider Threat Special Interest Group, Insider Threat Incidents Report April 2025 link
- Cybersecurity Insiders, 2024 Insider Threat Report link
- IBM Security, 83 percent of organizations reported insider attacks in 2024 link
- Verizon, Data Breach Investigations Report 2024 link
- Ponemon Institute, Cost of Insider Threats Global Report 2024 link
