Insider threats rarely arrive with the drama of a ransomware attack or the spectacle of a zero-day exploit. They are quiet. They are personal. They are often invisible until the damage is already done. This past week, the security community was reminded of that truth when new reporting confirmed that CrowdStrike had dealt with an insider who leaked internal screenshots to a cybercrime collective.
This was not a breach caused by a vulnerability or a misconfiguration. It was not the result of a sophisticated intrusion. It was a human driven event. One employee. One decision. One moment where the wrong incentive won.
In a recent article on SecureFromInside.com, I argued that companies should offer financial rewards to employees who report bribe attempts. The logic is simple. If attackers are offering money to insiders, then organizations must counter with legitimate financial incentives that make honesty more profitable than betrayal. The CrowdStrike incident is a perfect example of where that approach could have changed everything.
Let us walk through what happened, what the sources confirm, and how a financial incentive program could have prevented the entire event.
A Small Leak With Big Implications
CrowdStrike confirmed that an internal employee shared screenshots of internal systems with external threat actors. The screenshots were later posted on Telegram by a group calling itself Scattered Lapsus Hunters. According to reporting from BleepingComputer in the article titled CrowdStrike catches insider feeding information to hackers, the company identified and terminated the insider after an internal investigation. CrowdStrike emphasized that its systems were never breached and that customer data remained protected.
This was not a technical compromise. It was a human compromise. The insider simply took pictures of their screen and shared them externally. That small act created a ripple effect that reached the public sphere and triggered widespread discussion about insider risk.
The Threat Actor Collective Behind the Leak
The screenshots were posted by Scattered Lapsus Hunters, a collective that merges members from Scattered Spider, LAPSUS, and ShinyHunters. This group has been responsible for a long list of high-profile extortion campaigns. They have targeted companies such as Google, Cisco, Allianz Life, Qantas, Adidas, Workday, and multiple subsidiaries of LVMH. These details were highlighted in the same BleepingComputer report titled CrowdStrike catches insider feeding information to hackers.
This group is known for its aggressive recruitment of insiders. They use social engineering, financial incentives, and psychological pressure to convince employees to provide access or data. In this case, the group claimed they offered the insider twenty five thousand dollars in exchange for access to CrowdStrike systems. They also claimed they received authentication cookies from the insider, although CrowdStrike had already detected the activity and cut off access by that point.
This is the exact scenario I described in my earlier article about financial incentives for insider threat mitigation. Attackers are offering money. Employees are listening. Companies are not countering with anything comparable. The economics are unbalanced, and attackers know it.
What the Screenshots Revealed
The leaked images showed internal dashboards, including an Okta Single Sign On panel used by employees. TechCrunch reviewed these images, as referenced in the article CrowdStrike Fires Insider for Sharing Internal System Details with Hackers. The screenshots did not reveal a systemic compromise. They did not show evidence of a network level intrusion. Instead, they showed what an employee could see on their own screen.
This is what makes the incident so important. Screenshots are one of the simplest forms of data exfiltration. They bypass traditional data loss prevention tools. They are easy to capture and easy to share. They are also incredibly difficult to detect without behavioral analytics or session monitoring.
CrowdStrike’s response shows that the company had the right controls in place. They detected the suspicious activity, investigated it, and terminated the insider before any deeper access could be established. They also referred the case to law enforcement, as noted in both the BleepingComputer and Cybersecurity News reports.
Where Financial Incentives Could Have Changed Everything
In my earlier article on SecureFromInside.com, I argued that companies should pay employees for reporting bribe attempts. The logic is straightforward. If attackers are offering money, then organizations must offer money too. Not as a punishment. Not as a bounty for catching colleagues. But as a reward for honesty.
Imagine if the CrowdStrike employee had known that reporting a bribe attempt would earn them the same twenty-five thousand dollars that the attackers were offering. The insider would have had a safe, profitable, and legitimate path forward. Instead of taking screenshots, they could have reported the outreach. Instead of becoming a liability, they could have become a source of intelligence.
This is not theoretical. It is practical. It is proven. It is the same model used in anti-fraud programs, whistleblower systems, and airport smuggling prevention. When the reward for honesty outweighs the reward for betrayal, the system stabilizes.
The CrowdStrike incident is a perfect example of where such a program could have prevented the entire event.
The Broader Context: A Growing Insider Recruitment Economy
The reporting from SecurityWeek in the article CrowdStrike Insider Helped Hackers Falsely Claim System Breach adds more context. It confirms that the insider sold screenshots to cybercriminals and that the threat actors attempted to use the images to falsely claim a broader compromise. The article also notes that the group behind the leak has claimed over one thousand victims in recent data theft campaigns targeting Salesforce customers.
This is the real story behind the CrowdStrike incident. It is not about a breach. It is about a growing underground economy where insiders are recruited, paid, and manipulated into providing access. It is about the shift from technical exploitation to human exploitation. It is about the realization that even the most secure environments can be exposed by a single individual with legitimate access.
Why This Incident Matters for the Security Community
There are several lessons that security leaders should take from this event.
First, insider threats are not hypothetical.
They are active, ongoing, and increasingly organized.
Second, attackers are using money as a weapon.
Companies must respond with their own financial incentives.
Third, screenshots are a blind spot.
They are easy to capture and hard to detect.
Fourth, detection and response matter more than perfection.
CrowdStrike acted quickly and contained the damage.
Fifth, culture and incentives must evolve.
Employees need a reason to report bribe attempts.
Right now, they have none.
Attackers, on the other hand, are offering plenty.
A Final Reflection
The CrowdStrike insider incident is not a story about failure. It is a story about reality. Even the strongest security programs face insider risk. Even the most advanced tools cannot prevent a determined employee from taking a picture of their screen. What matters is how quickly an organization can detect, investigate, and contain that activity.
But there is another lesson here. One that goes beyond detection and response. One that goes to the heart of human behavior. If attackers are offering money to insiders, then companies must offer money too. Not as a bribe. Not as a bounty. But as a recognition that integrity has value.
If the CrowdStrike employee had been offered a legitimate financial reward for reporting the bribe attempt, this entire incident could have unfolded differently. Instead of becoming a threat, the insider could have become a defender.
This is the future of insider threat mitigation. Not just controls. Not just monitoring. But incentives that make honesty the most profitable choice.
Sources
CrowdStrike catches insider feeding information to hackers
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/crowdstrike-catches-insider-feeding-information-to-hackers/ (bleepingcomputer.com in Bing)
CrowdStrike Fires Insider for Sharing Internal System Details with Hackers
https://cybersecuritynews.com/crowdstrike-fires-insider-for-sharing-internal-system-details/ (cybersecuritynews.com in Bing)
CrowdStrike Insider Helped Hackers Falsely Claim System Breach
https://www.securityweek.com/crowdstrike-insider-helped-hackers-falsely-claim-system-breach/ (securityweek.com in Bing)
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