In cybersecurity, openness is usually a strength. Teams share malware signatures, phishing tactics, and attack indicators so that everyone can defend themselves better. But when it comes to insider threats, the conversation suddenly goes quiet. Security teams rarely explain how they catch insiders, and that silence is intentional.
The problem is, secrecy cuts both ways. It protects detection methods from being gamed, but it also limits collaboration and leaves gaps in defenses. Let’s break down why teams keep these methods under wraps, what dangers come from sharing too much, and what risks come from saying too little.
What Counts as an Insider Threat?
An insider threat is any harmful action that comes from someone with legitimate access to systems or data. That could be an employee, contractor, or even a trusted partner. These threats usually fall into four categories:
- Malicious insiders: People who deliberately steal, leak, or sabotage data.
- Negligent insiders: Well-meaning staff who make mistakes, like reusing passwords or mishandling sensitive files.
- Compromised insiders: Users whose accounts are hijacked by external attackers.
- Third-party insiders: Contractors or vendors with privileged access who unintentionally expand the attack surface.
The challenge is that insiders already have the keys to the kingdom. Unlike external attackers, they don’t need to break in. That makes detection much harder.
Why Security Teams Stay Quiet
Preventing Evasion
If a company openly explains how it detects insider threats, malicious insiders can adjust their behavior to avoid detection. For example, if they know that downloading large files at odd hours triggers alerts, they’ll simply schedule downloads during business hours. If they know that USB activity is monitored, they’ll switch to cloud storage.
Sharing too much is like handing an attacker the playbook. It makes their job easier.
Protecting Fragile Signals
Insider detection often relies on subtle patterns: unusual login times, accessing files outside of a normal role, or sending sensitive data to personal email. These signals are fragile. If attackers know exactly what’s being monitored, they can manipulate their behavior to stay just under the radar.
Some programs even use deception, like fake files or honey credentials, to catch malicious insiders. If those tactics are publicized, they lose their effectiveness.
Legal and Ethical Concerns
There’s also a human side. Employees don’t want to feel like they’re under constant surveillance. If security teams reveal every detail of their monitoring, it can create distrust, spark HR disputes, or even raise legal challenges under privacy laws.
The balance is tricky: protect the organization without making employees feel like they’re being spied on.
The Risks of Too Much Secrecy
While secrecy protects detection methods, it also creates problems.
Stagnant Defenses
If teams never share their approaches, they miss out on peer review and feedback. That can lead to outdated rules, blind spots, and higher false positives. Without collaboration, detection strategies can stagnate.
Missed Collaboration
Cybersecurity thrives on shared knowledge. When insider threat detection stays siloed, organizations lose the chance to learn from each other’s mistakes and successes. That slows down progress across the industry.
False Confidence
Silence can also create a false sense of security. Leaders may assume that “no news is good news,” when in reality, the detection program might be missing key signals. Without external validation, it’s easy to overestimate effectiveness.
Real World Examples
HR Payroll Fraud in China (2025)
An HR manager created 22 fake employee records and siphoned off $2.2 million in payroll funds over eight years. She was only caught when a colleague noticed suspiciously “perfect” attendance records. This highlights how non-technical departments can also harbor insider risks.
Marks & Spencer Contractor Breach (2025)
Hackers compromised the email credentials of a third-party IT contractor, exposing 9.4 million customer records. Even though payment data wasn’t stolen, the breach caused £300 million in damages. It underscores the supply chain insider risk.
Coinbase Support Agent Bribery (2025)
Scammers bribed external support agents to hand over sensitive customer data, including Social Security numbers. The attackers attempted to extort $20 million, but Coinbase refused and instead offered a bounty to track them down. This case shows how third-party insiders can be exploited.
What Can Be Shared Safely
Security teams don’t need to reveal every detail, but some transparency is possible and even helpful. For example:
- General principles: Explaining that behavioral analytics and anomaly detection are used, without revealing exact thresholds.
- Lessons learned: Sharing what worked, what didn’t, and how detection evolved.
- Case studies: Providing sanitized examples that highlight the importance of monitoring without exposing sensitive methods.
This kind of sharing builds collaboration while keeping the most sensitive details private.
Best Practices for Insider Threat Programs
So how can organizations balance secrecy with effectiveness? Here are some proven approaches:
Use Layered Detection
Don’t rely on a single signal. Combine identity data, file access patterns, endpoint activity, and network traffic. The more layers, the harder it is for insiders to evade detection.
Deploy Deception Tactics
Use honey files, fake credentials, or decoy systems to lure malicious insiders. Keep these tactics confidential so they remain effective.
Audit and Update Regularly
Review detection rules and thresholds often. Business processes change, and so do insider tactics. Regular updates keep defenses relevant.
Build a Culture of Trust
Employees should understand that insider threat programs exist to protect the organization, not to spy on them. Be transparent about goals and policies, even if you don’t share the technical details.
Collaborate Discreetly
Work with trusted peers, industry groups, and ISACs (Information Sharing and Analysis Centers) to exchange insights. Share enough to learn, but not enough to give attackers an edge.
Finding the Balance
Insider threats are uniquely dangerous because they exploit trust. Detecting them requires sophisticated, often covert methods. That’s why security teams are reluctant to share too much. But total secrecy isn’t the answer either.
The best approach is balance: share principles, governance models, and lessons learned, but keep the operational details private. This way, the community benefits from collaboration while adversaries are kept in the dark.
Final Thoughts
Insider threat detection lives in a gray area. Too much transparency, and you risk giving attackers the tools to evade detection. Too much secrecy, and you risk stagnation, blind spots, and a lack of accountability.
The solution is to be open about the “why” and “what” of insider threat programs: why they exist, what they aim to achieve, and how they respect privacy – all while keeping the “how” confidential.
That balance protects organizations, builds trust with employees, and strengthens the broader cybersecurity community.
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