Modern smart cars are more than just vehicles; they’re computers on wheels. With complex software, cloud connectivity, and sensitive data, these cars face risks not only from external hackers but also from insiders. This report explores how employees, contractors, and other trusted parties can exploit smart vehicles, drawing on real-world cases from consumer cars, commercial fleets, and autonomous taxis. We’ll look at technical vulnerabilities, organizational risks, and strategies to defend against these threats.
Insider threats occur when someone with authorized access misuses it to harm the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of systems. In the automotive world, this means someone inside the company could undermine vehicle security or operations. Insiders are responsible for over 22 percent of security incidents across industries, and the average annual cost of these incidents has surged to $17.4 million per organization in 2025. With smart cars generating huge amounts of data and being increasingly software-driven, the stakes are higher than ever.
Modern vehicles have many connected systems: telematics units, smartphone integrations, autonomous driving software and each a potential attack surface. While most attention focuses on external hackers, an insider with legitimate access can bypass many defenses. For example, vehicle telematics and backend services collect data like location, speed, and user info, and enable remote functions. The U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center warns that these data paths present opportunities for malicious insiders to exfiltrate and manipulate sensitive information. In short, an insider could covertly harvest driver data or even alter it, such as falsifying a vehicle’s location or disabling safety alerts.
Insiders come in different forms, with varied motivations:
A compromised insider can turn the car into a smartphone on wheels against its owner. Some potential malicious outcomes include:
Insider incidents in automotive range from trade secret theft to direct sabotage of vehicles and infrastructure. Here are some notable cases:
2015–16: Waymo (Google) Self-Driving Tech Theft
A star engineer downloaded about 14,000 confidential files, including LiDAR designs and proprietary code, before resigning to form a rival startup later acquired by Uber. This became the largest trade-secret heist in automotive history. Waymo sued, and the insider was convicted and sentenced to 18 months. Uber paid a $245 million settlement in stock.
2010: Texas Auto Center Disgruntled Ex-Employee
A fired employee used previously issued credentials and a shared password to log into the dealership’s system, remotely disabling starters and setting off horns on over 100 customer cars. Dozens of owners found their cars dead or blaring nonstop horns. The insider was arrested for computer intrusion, highlighting the risk of insufficient access revocation.
2018: Tesla Sabotage and Data Leak
A disgruntled internal tech staff member made unauthorized changes to Tesla’s Manufacturing Operating System and exported a large volume of sensitive data to third parties, using false usernames to cover tracks. Motivated by resentment after missing a promotion, the sabotage caused extensive operational and data damage.
2023: Tesla “Tesla Files” Data Leak
Two departing employees exfiltrated about 100 GB of confidential data from Tesla’s IT systems and leaked it to a foreign news outlet. Data included personal information of over 75,000 employees, customer bank details, and sensitive Autopilot defect complaints. Tesla reported the breach as insider wrongdoing to regulators and could face up to $3.3 billion in GDPR fines.
2023: Unnamed Auto Manufacturer Supplier Network Sabotage
A fired contractor retained access via an overlooked account and deliberately sabotaged the company’s supplier network, stealing proprietary design and process data. This caused operational disruption in production lines and leaked sensitive intellectual property, resulting in reputational damage and a scramble to restore systems.
2024 (Hypothetical): V2X Backdoor Exploit
An engineer at a Vehicle-to-Everything device supplier secretly leaves a root backdoor in roadside units. After leaving, leaks the backdoor info out of spite. Hackers then exploit it citywide, manipulating traffic data and even altering EV charging stations, causing fires. Although hypothetical, it demonstrates how a single insider-planted flaw can escalate into widespread public safety emergencies.
Insiders exploit their knowledge of and access to technical weaknesses in vehicle systems or related infrastructure. Here are some critical vulnerability areas:
Privileged Access to Telematics Systems
Connected cars often rely on telematics platforms for remote monitoring, firmware updates, or immobilization. Insiders with credentials to these systems can misuse them. For example, the Texas dealership case showed how access to an electronic immobilization service allowed one person to shut down vehicles remotely. If such commands are not properly secured, they become easy tools for sabotage.
Backdoors in Software and Firmware
Insiders involved in software development might intentionally plant backdoors or logic bombs in vehicle code, which can later be used to breach systems or alter vehicle behavior. Even if not intentional, poorly secured debug interfaces or default passwords in car ECUs act like backdoors. A malicious employee could leave such a weakness in place during development or fail to report it, knowing they or their associates could exploit it later.
Over-the-Air Update Abuse
Many smart vehicles receive OTA software updates. These updates are usually signed and verified, but an insider with access to the update server or signing keys could push a malicious update. This is a particularly dangerous vector; a rogue OTA update could simultaneously infect or disable an entire fleet of cars.
Inadequate Access Controls and Oversight
Technical controls that fail to implement least privilege or proper monitoring can be exploited. For example, if all engineers share access to a wide swath of systems, one insider can wander into systems they don’t need. Tesla’s 2023 breach likely involved insiders using access from prior roles to gather far more data than they should have. The absence of real-time alerts for unusual data downloads gives insiders a window to operate unnoticed.
Supply Chain and Third-Party Components
Smart cars are built from a complex supply chain of hardware and software suppliers. If a supplier’s insider implants a flaw in a component, that vulnerability is delivered inside potentially millions of vehicles. This is akin to a software supply chain attack from within. A real example involves an IT contractor in a supplier network causing havoc—not inserting code into a car but disrupting the pipeline that ensures cars get the parts or software they need.
Insider Knowledge of Existing Bugs
Sometimes insiders don’t need to create new vulnerabilities; they can exploit known ones that only an insider would realistically know. A smart vehicle system might have an undocumented diagnostic command or a secret maintenance password. An insider could leak these to hackers or use them directly.
Consequences of Technical Exploits
When insiders leverage these technical gaps, the consequences can range from nuisance-level pranks to life-threatening scenarios. Even small interferences can have outsized effects. For example, sending fake radar signals could make a car’s adaptive cruise control suddenly brake or accelerate dangerously. An insider with the ability to inject false sensor data or commands at the right time could orchestrate such an event intentionally.
Organizational Risks and Human Factors
Technical security is only half the battle; the human element is equally crucial. Insiders exploit trust, and often their actions are enabled or exacerbated by organizational lapses.
Disgruntlement and Misconduct
Unhappy employees can become ticking time bombs. The Tesla and dealership cases show personal grievances directly translated into sabotage. Organizations that ignore red flags, such as an employee voicing extreme frustration or displaying erratic behavior, may miss chances to intervene.
Culture and “Keys to the Kingdom”
If a company has a culture of widespread access, it essentially hands a loaded gun to every insider. Role-based access control is often neglected. Waymo did not immediately restrict Levandowski’s access upon his departure announcement, enabling the download of vast troves of R\&D data. Similarly, if one IT admin account can control an entire fleet, that single point of failure is dangerous.
Supply Chain Insider Risk
Modern car companies rely on many suppliers for components, software, and services. A vendor’s employee might not feel loyalty to the car brand, yet they might have direct access to the brand’s systems or data. The 2023 supplier network sabotage case is a prime example: a contractor had VPN access into the automaker’s system and used it after termination.
Espionage and Competitiveness
The auto industry is highly competitive, especially in EV and autonomous tech. This competition can tempt insiders to engage in corporate espionage. Levandowski’s case with Waymo and Uber is essentially industrial espionage under the guise of a startup acquisition.
Lack of Insider Threat Training and Reporting
In many companies, employees are not trained to recognize or report insider threats. Co-workers might notice unusual behavior but may stay silent either out of fear or not wanting to appear suspicious of a colleague. Instituting an anonymous reporting channel and cultivating a culture where reporting security concerns is encouraged can mitigate this.
Negligence and Human Error
Not every insider incident is malicious. Sometimes, insiders inadvertently cause harm. For example, an engineer might misconfigure a cloud server containing vehicle data, leaving it open to the internet. Or an employee might lose a laptop that has critical vehicle cryptographic keys. If these mistakes occur, they can be just as damaging.
Consumer Cars
For individual smart car owners, an insider threat at the manufacturer or dealership can affect them silently. They might become victims of a data breach or suffer mysterious car malfunctions if a service technician with ill intent tweaks something. Another concern is privacy; a dealership employee or OEM backend engineer could surveil an owner’s vehicle location or driving stats out of curiosity or malice.
Fleet Vehicles
Businesses that manage fleets often use centralized systems to monitor and control vehicles. Insiders in those businesses or their software providers could at worst cause fleet-wide outages or reroute vehicles. Fleets often have more at stake per insider incident; one act can idle dozens or hundreds of vehicles, amplifying the damage.
Autonomous Taxis (Robotaxis)
In a fully autonomous taxi service, human drivers are out of the loop, so the system’s integrity is paramount. An insider could attack this in several ways: tamper with the ride dispatch algorithms to cause massive routing failures, plant malware in the vehicles’ software before deployment, or abuse administrative access to spy on passengers via onboard cameras or microphones.
Preventing and mitigating insider threats requires a blend of technical controls, process governance, and organizational culture. Here are key mitigation strategies:
Unauthorized Remote Vehicle Control
Insider Planting Backdoors or Malicious Code
Privileged Credential Abuse
Data Exfiltration (Theft) of Designs or Personal Data
Supply Chain Insider Threats
Human Behavioral Risks
Governments and industry groups are recognizing the threat to smart vehicles. For instance, the U.S. Department of Commerce started addressing risks from connected car technology, considering rules to ensure connected vehicles and their manufacturers build in security against both external and internal threats. Automotive cybersecurity standards like ISO/SAE 21434 and UNECE WP.29 now have provisions that implicitly cover insider misuse.
Another emerging practice is information sharing about incidents. When Tesla suffered the 2023 insider leak, other automakers took notice and presumably reviewed their own controls. Industry consortiums and CERTs have started to include insider incidents in their advisories.
Smart cars have improved convenience and safety, but they come with a new dimension of risk: the very people entrusted to build and manage these vehicles can turn them against us. Insiders, whether driven by anger, greed, or coercion, have avenues to sabotage operations, steal crown-jewel data, invade privacy, and even endanger lives by exploiting the digital controls in vehicles. Real incidents from the past decade show that this threat is real and pressing, spanning all types of smart vehicles from personal Teslas to entire fleets.
However, the auto industry is not helpless. By learning from these incidents and implementing robust safeguards, manufacturers and service providers can greatly diminish the insider threat:
In the end, protecting smart cars from insider threats is about protecting the trust we place in those who design, build, and operate them. As vehicles become more autonomous and connected, that trust, fortified by strong security measures, is what will keep our cars safely under our control, and not subverted for malicious ends.
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